Herein, design of false data injection attack on a distributed cyber-physical system is considered. A stochastic process with linear dynamics and Gaussian noise is measured by multiple agent nodes, each equipped with multiple sensors. The agent nodes form a multi-hop network among themselves. Each agent node computes an estimate of the process by using its sensor observations and messages obtained from neighbouring nodes, via Kalman-consensus filtering. An external attacker, capable of arbitrarily manipulating the sensor observations of some or all agent nodes, injects errors into those sensor observations. The goal of the attacker is to steer the estimates at the agent nodes as close as possible to a pre-specified value, while respecting a constraint on the attack detection probability. To this end, a constrained optimization problem is formulated to find the optimal parameter values of a certain class of linear attacks. The parameters of linear attack are learnt on-line via a combination of stochastic approximation and online stochastic gradient descent. Numerical results demonstrate the efficacy of the attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent times, there have been significant interest in designing cyber-physical systems (CPS) that combine the cyber world and the physical world via seamless integration of sensing, computation, communication, control and learning. CPS has widespread applications such as networked monitoring and control of industrial processes, disaster management, smart grids, intelligent transportation systems, etc. These applications critically depend on estimation of a physical process via multiple sensors over a wireless network. However, increasing use of wireless networks in sharing the sensed data has rendered the sensors vulnerable to various cyber-attacks. In this paper, we focus on false data injection (FDI) attacks which is an integrity or deception attack where the attacker modifies the information flowing through the network [1] , [2] , in contrast to a denial-of-service attack where the attacker blocks system resources (e.g., wireless jamming attack [3] ). In FDI, the attacker either breaks the cryptography of the data packets or physically manipulates the sensors (e.g., putting a heater near a temperature sensor).
The cyber-physical systems either need to compute the process estimate in a remote estimator (centralized case), or often multiple nodes or components of the system need to estimate the same process over time via sensor observations and the information shared over a network (distributed case). The problem of FDI attack design and its detection has received This work was supported by the faculty seed grant and professional development allowance (PDA) of IIT Delhi, and one or more of the following grants: ONR N00014-15-1-2550, NSF CCF-1718560,NSF CCF-1410009, NSF CPS-1446901, NSF CCF-1817200, and ARO 74745LSMUR. significant attention in recent times; attack design: conditions for undetectable FDI attack [4] , design of a linear deception attack scheme to fool the popular χ 2 detector (see [5] ), optimal attack design for noiseless systems [6] . The paper [7] designs an optimal attack to steer the state of a control system to a desired target under a constraint on the attack detection probability. On the other hand, attempts on attack detection includes centralized (and decentralized as well) schemes for noiseless systems [8] , coding of sensor output along with χ 2 detector [9] , comparing the sensor observations with those coming from from a few known safe sensors [10] , and the attack detection and secure estimation schemes based on innovation vectors in [11] . Attempts on attack-resilient state estimation include: [12] for bounded noise, [13] - [15] for adaptive filter design using stochastic approximation, [16] that uses sparsity models to characterize the switching location attack in a noiseless linear system and state recovery constraints for various attack modes. FDI attack and its mitigation in power systems are addressed in [17] - [19] . Attack-resilient state estimation and control in noiseless systems are discussed in [20] and [21] . Performance bound of stealthy attack in a single sensor-remote estimator system using Kalman filter was characterized in [22] .
However, there have been very few attempts for attack design and mitigation in distributed CPS, except [23] for attack detection and secure estimation, [24] for attack detection in networked control system using a certain dynamic watermarking strategy, and [25] for attack detection in power systems. To our knowledge, there has been no attempt to theoretically design an attack strategy in distributed CPS. In light of these issues, our contributions in this paper are the following: (i) Under the Kalman-consensus filter (KCF, see [26] ) for distributed estimation, we design a novel attack scheme that steers the estimates in all estimators towards a target value, while respecting a constraint on the attack detection probability under the popular χ 2 detector adapted to the distributed setting. The attack scheme is reminiscent of the popular linear attack scheme [5] , but the novelty lies in online learning of the parameters in the attack algorithm via simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation (SPSA, see [27] ). The optimization problem is cast as an online optimization problem, where SPSA is used for online stochastic gradient descent (see [28, Chapter 3] ). (ii) The constraint on attack detection probability is met by updating a Lagrange multiplier via stochastic approximation in a slower timescale.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND BACKGROUND
In this paper, bold capital letters, bold small letters and capital letters with caligraphic font will denote matrices, vectors and sets respectively.
A. Sensing and estimation model
We consider a connected, multihop wireless network of N agent nodes denoted by N . = {1, 2, · · · , N }. The set of neighbouring nodes of node k is denoted by N k , and let N k . = |N k |. There is a discrete-time stochastic process {x(t)} t≥0 (where x(t) ∈ R q ) which is a linear Gaussian process evolving as follows:
Each agent node is equipped with one or more sensors who make some observation about the process. The vector observation received at node k at time t is given by:
where H k is a matrix of appropriate dimension and v k (t) is a Gaussian observation noise which is independent across sensors and i.i.d. across t. At time t, each agent node k ∈ N declares an estimatê x (k) (t) using Kalman consensus filtering (KCF, see [26] ) which involves the following sequence of steps:
3) Node k computes its final estimate of the process as:
Here G k and C k are the Kalman and consensus gain matrices used by node k, respectively.
B. False data injection (FDI) attack
At time t, sensors associated to any subset of nodes A t ⊂ N can be under attack. A node k ∈ A t receives an observation:
where e k (t) is the error injected by the attacker. The attacker seeks to insert the error sequence {e k (t) : k ∈ A t } t≥0 in order to introduce error in the estimation. If A t = A for all t, then the attack is called a static attack, otherwise the attack is called a switching location attack. We will consider only static attack in this paper. We assume that the attacker can observê x (k) (t) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ N once they are computed by the agent nodes.
C. The χ 2 detector
Let us define the innovation vector at node k by z k (t) := y k (t) − H k Ax (k) (t − 1). Let us assume that, under no attack, {z k (t)} t≥0 reaches its steady-state distribution N (0, Σ k ). Under a possible attack, a standard technique (see [5] , [10] ) to detect any anomaly in {z t } t≥0 is the χ 2 detector, which tests whether the innovation vector follows the desired Gaussian distribution. The detector at each agent node observes the innovation sequence over a pre-specified window of J time-slots, and declares an attack at time τ if
where η is a threshold which can be adjusted to control the false alarm probability. The covariance matrix Σ k can be computed from standard results on KCF as in [26] .
The authors of [5] proposed a linear injection attack to fool the χ 2 detector in a centralized, remote estimation setting. Motivated by [5] , we also propose a linear attack, where, at time t, the sensor(s) associated with any node k ∈ A modifies the innovation vector asz
for suitable matrices and vectors M k and d k . This is equivalent to modifying the observation vector toỹ
the attack is called stationary, else non-stationary.
D. The optimization problem
The attacker seeks to steer the estimate as close as possible to some pre-defined value x * , while keeping the attack detection probability per unit time under some constraint value α. Note that, the probability of attack detection per unit time slot can be upper bounded as:
where the first and second inequalities come from union bound and Markov inequality, respectively. Hence, the attacker seeks to solve the following constrained optimization problem:
This problem can be relaxed by a Lagrange multiplier λ to obtain the following unconstrained optimization problem:
The following standard result tells us how to choose λ.
Proposition 1. Let us consider (CP) and its relaxed version (UP). If there exists a λ * ≥ 0 and matrices
the optimal solution of (UP) under λ = λ * , and (ii) the tuple
is an optimal solution for (CP) as well.
III. ATTACK DESIGN
We first analytically characterize the dynamics of the deviation (x (k) (t) − x * ) in presence of linear attack, which will be used in developing the attack design algorithm later.
Our proposed algorithm maintains iterates
be a sigma algebra; this is the information available to the attacker at time (τ + 1) before a new attack.
A. Dynamics of deviation from target estimate
Let us assume for the sake of analysis that the attacker uses constant T k and S k respectively, for all k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }. Under this attack:
Let us define θ (k) (t)
.
. = E(x(t)|{y k (τ )} 1≤k≤N,τ ≤t ) = E(x(t)|F t ) which can be computed by a standard Kalman filter. Letφ(t) ∼ N (0, R(t)), whose distribution can be computed by a standard Kalman filter. Hence, conditioned on F t , the distribution of φ(t) .
Clearly, E(||θ (k) (t)|| 2 |F t−1 ) can be expressed as (9) . Note that, given
On the other hand, given F t−1 , x(t − 1) ∼ N (x(t − 1), R(t − 1)) where (x(t − 1), R(t − 1)) can be computed by a standard Kalman filter. Now,
is given by (10) .
In case of nonstationary attack, these results will hold w.r.t.
Hence, the function
B. The attack design algorithm
In this subsection, we propose an optimal linear attack algorithm for distributed CPS (OLAAD). The OLAAD algorithm involves two-timescale stochastic approximation [29] , which is basically a stochastic gradient descent algorithm with a noisy gradient estimate; (UP) is solved via SPSA in the faster timescale, and λ is updated in the slower timescale.
The algorithm requires three positive step size sequences {a(t)} t≥0 , {b(t)} t≥0 and {c(t)} t≥0 satisfying the following criteria:
a(t) = 0, (iv) lim t→∞ c(t) = 0, and (v) ∞ t=0 a 2 (t) c 2 (t) < ∞. The first three conditions are standard requirements for two-timescale stochastic approximation. The fourth condition ensures that the gradient estimate is asymptotically unbiased, and the fifth condition is required for the convergence of SPSA.
The OLAAD algorithm Input:
For t = 1, 2, 3, · · · : 1) For each 1 ≤ k ≤ N , the attacker generates random matrices ∆ (k) (t), Γ (k) (t), Π (k) (t) and β (k) (t) having same dimensions as T k (t − 1), U k (t − 1), M k (t − 1) and d k (t − 1) respectively, whose entries are uniformly and independently chosen from the set {−1, 1}.
2) The attacker computes T
3) The attacker computes:
using (9) and (10) under
The attacker computes S k (t) . = (U k (t)) U k (t) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ N . 5) The sensors make observations {y k (t)} 1≤k≤N , which are accessed by the attacker. 6) The attacker calculates z
) chosen independently of all other variables. The observations are accordingly modified as y k (t) =z k (t) + H k Ax (k) (t − 1) and sent to the agent nodes. 8) The attacker updates the Lagrange multiplier as follows:
9) The agent nodes compute the estimates locally, using (3) and the modified {ỹ k (t)} 1≤k≤N . The agent nodes broadcast their estimates to their neighbouring nodes. end
The OLAAD algorithm combines the online stochastic gradient descent (OSGD) algorithm of [28, Chapter 3] with twotimescale stochastic approximation of [29] . The λ(t) iterate is updated in the slower timescale to meet the constraint in (CP). In the faster timescale, OSGD is used for solving (UP). Note that, OLAAD has no guarantee of convergence to globally optimal solution.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We consider a line topology with N = 3 agent nodes. Process dimension q = 1 and the observation dimension at each node is 2. The system parameters A, Q, {R k } 1≤k≤3 , {H k } 1≤k≤3 are chosen randomly. The KCF parameters {G k , C k } 1≤k≤3 are computed using a technique from [26] , and {Σ k } 1≤k≤3 are computed by simulating the KCF under no attack.
For FDI attack, we set x * = 5, α = 0.3, η = 500, J = 3, λ(0) = 7, a(t) = 0.5 t 0.6 , b(t) = 0.5 t 0.9 , c(t) = 0.01 t 0.1 , T k (t) = I for all 1 ≤ k ≤ 3 and for all t ≥ 1, simulated the performance of OLAAD for 1000000 iterations and evaluated its performance between 500000-th to 1000000-th iteration. However, motivated by the ADAM algorithm from [30] , we implemented an adaptive step size version of SGD with the basic step sizes being {a(t), b(t)} t≥1 , 1 though gradient estimation was done via simultaneous perturbation using step size {c(t)} t≥1 . We simulated multiple problem instances for different sample paths; some results are tabulated below: We notice that the attack detection probability is 0 because we consider a stronger constraint (upper bound to the actual attack detection probability) in our formulation. The attack detection probability also depends on the system realization, and the values of η and J. For some other values of η and J and various system realizations, we obtained the following: In all problem instances, deviation from x * means the squared distance of x (k) (t) from x * , summed over nodes and averaged over time; similar definition applies to deviation from origin. We observe that OLAAD significantly reduces the deviation from x * = 5, and increases the deviation from the origin which is the mean of x(t). In all instances, constraint on attack detection probability is satisfied. This shows that OLAAD is a viable FDI attack scheme for distributed CPS.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have designed an optimal linear attack for distributed cyber-physical systems. The parameters of the attack scheme were learnt and optimized on-line. Numerical results demonstrated the efficacy of the proposed attack scheme. In future, we seek to extend this work for unknown process and observation dynamics.
